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The problem of professional liability insurance for health care pro-
viders and, more particularly, for medical doctors and hospitals, has
been described as a "crisis." This crisis is usually viewed from the per-
spective of the physician, because he has been most vocal in his re-
sponse, and this reaction, which closely parallels that of the public, has
been widely reported.' His concern has also been more widely publi-
cized because it has taken the form of work stoppages, retirement, re-
moval to other jurisdictions and, more commonly, threats of such action.
The physician's complaint is that malpractice coverage has simply
not been available or that it has been available only at increased rates.
In Indiana the problem of unavailability has been attacked by the legis-
lature through provision in the new Act for a residual market for in-
surance for doctors and hospitals unable to obtain coverage through the
private market.2 An effort to reduce the cost of insurance has been
made by lowering the amount for which a doctor can be sued, thus
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lowering the amount of coverage which he must purchase to protect
his personal assets from suits by patients.3
Whether the new law will serve to make the insuring of doctors
attractive to private insurers remains to be seen. If we are to make
any prediction in that regard, we must try to understand the legal cli-
mate in which the present "crisis" situation exists.
For many years, doctors were offered professional liability coverage
at an annual premium less than that which they might pay for a family
automobile policy on two or three cars driven by teen-agers. Suits
against doctors were unusual,' and were shunned by many attorneys as
expensive and difficult to prepare and very difficult to prove. Patients
were reluctant to sue the family doctor or the respected surgeon of the
community, and a very real respect for the ability and dedication of
doctors gave the patient conviction that a poor result was not the doc-
tor's fault-he had done the best that could be done given the circum-
stances and the state of the art of healing.
Eventually, new or enlarged theories of liability were employed by
appellate courts, and these new guidelines made the preparation of such
cases more attractive and easier to pursue.' Parallel increases in awards
brought publicity to huge recoveries and various law societies publicized
techniques for successful prosecution.6 A new wave of patients was
given a medical "education" by dozens of medical television shows in
which miraculous cures were commonplace and failure so rare as to be
unbelievable. Man's faith in modern medicine made failure the hall-
mark of negligence and quackery.
Partly as a result of these developments, 90 percent of all malprac-
tice cases ever filed have been filed within the past ten years. 7 Further-
more, there has been a ten percent increase in the number of such cases
T ZiD. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns Supp. 1975).
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filed each year.' One out of every three practicing physicians can expect
to be sued during his career, and doctors in specialties involving surgery
and anesthesia may expect a higher frequency of claims. Thus, in an
era when the American public has available to it better over-all health
care than any other nation in history, there is more medical malpractice
alleged than was ever dreamed of when medicine was administered by
witch doctors and barbers.
The problem facing hospitals is even more dramatic. While sta-
tistics in the medical malpractice field are somewhat speculative (such
statistics are not assembled in a very scientific manner), respectable
opinion indicates that 74 percent of malpractice claims against doctors
arise in hospitals.9 Since the hospital is often made a defendant along
with the doctor, hospitals, for all practical purposes, face the same in-
surability problems as doctors-and hospitals have a greater exposure
to risks.
Indiana doctors have been protected for many years by liability insur-
ance written by eleven companies offering "medical malpractice" or pro-
fessional liability policies. Certain basic insurance principles are as mys-
terious to doctors as the most common medical technique is to the non-
professional. To understand the problem of insurance availability these
basic principles must be explored.
(1) Insurance is a business-science where basic rules of predicta-
bility of loss permit a professional risk bearer to fix a small premium
to be charged against a large number of risks so that the large losses
of a few of the premium payers can be paid and their personal loss
minimized. The larger the number of risks covered or insureds pro-
tected, the better this principle works, as the laws of probability are
more easily applied as the number of risks analyzed increases.
Thus, in the insuring of lives and other similar risks, very exact
predictions of loss can be achieved because accurate statistics are avail-
able and insureds can be expected to suffer loss in highly predictable
patterns of frequency and causation. Property insurance, such as the
insuring of residences against loss by fire, is likewise capable of a high
degree of predictability within statistically arranged classes of risk, loca-
tion, and type of loss. A prominent insurance leader has put it this
8 Address by Thomas F. Sheehan, President of GATX Insurance Co., Inc., A.B.A.
Section of Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation, ABA National Convention, Montreal,
Aug. 11, 1975.
9 U.S. DEP'T oF IHALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COM-
,IISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 9 (1973).
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way: "We are in the business of taking risks, not betting on sure
losers.'"
(2) The premiums or contributions of each risk to the fund from
which losses are to be paid must produce enough money to meet the
losses which are expected to result and the costs of operating the system.
If the rate charged for one class of business is inadequate to meet this
goal, the capital funds of the insurer and the reserves it has built up
for its insureds in other classes of business must be invaded to meet
the shortage. This process can only be sustained on a limited basis and
for a limited time. In the absence of an adequate rate, the losing class
of business must be abandoned or the insurer will become insolvent or
be forced to overcharge other classes of insureds to pay for the shortage
in the unprofitable line.
The application of this second principle is further complicated by
the fact that insurance loss statistics are slow to accumulate and often
difficult to analyze. Furthermore, upward changes in rates of insurance
premiums must be justified to state regulatory agencies before they can
be effective. Thereafter, the increased rate can only be applied effec-
tively at annual or longer intervals, depending on renewal dates. Thus,
for example, disastrous loss experience in one year will probably not
result in an effective increase in premium based on that experience for
three to five years. In a period of growing inflation, such an increase
is always insufficient by the time it is effective.
The application of these two principles to the insuring of profes-
sional liability of doctors is complicated by other factors. First, there
are currently only about 275,000 doctors practicing in the United States.
About 5,000 are practicing in Indiana.'1 There is, then, an insufficient
number of risks to produce credible statistics for prediction of the fre-
quency and size of losses. To use the same equation to construct a
premium rate for the 5,000 doctors (divided into five classes of prac-
tice) in Indiana, expecting the same accuracy as the actuarial premium
determined for a million motor vehicles in the same area, is obviously
fraught with danger.
Secondly, one of the basic elements of rate deternination for a
premium is the predictability of losses as to frequency and cost. In the
medical malpractice field in the United States, as well as in Indiana,
the growth of claims has been almost geometric in both frequency and
10 Roberts, A Course for Confidence, 36 J. INs. 2 (Sept.-Oct 1975).
11 I use the qualifying word "about" because such statistics are heavily affected by
educated guesses based on licensing, associating memberships, and interpretation.
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amount. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to classify doctors
by areas of special practice and to charge rates on five classes (seven in
some areas) which vary in their exposure, Likewise, rates differ from
state to state so as to reflect the greater generosity of courts and juries
in one state than in another when moved by compassion for an injured
patient. The more of these variables which occur, the more difficult
is a determination of an adequate rate.
As a result of all of these factors-a limited number of risks, a
resistance to adequate rates, and a blossoming jungle of ever-increasing
losses on medical malpractice-the top eleven insurers which have in-
sured 90 percent of the doctors in the United States have experienced
growing difficulty. This is the malpractice insurance dilemma.
Insurers have experienced losses paid and reserved during the last
ten years which are estimated to be two to three times the total pre-
miums collected, and the experience has been getting progressively worse
as inflation and social attitudes have continued to raise this ratio of
loss to premium each year. As of January 1975, when the Indiana Gen-
eral Assembly met, eleven states were considered to be in the midst of
crises of availability and premium rate, and the medical profession
was in a state of alarmed concern over both availability and price. The
problem was being discussed in Congress, in every legislature, and by
every medical association. In addition, insurers who did not write pro-
fessional liability insurance were alarmed by proposals, and by legisla-
tion in some states, forcing them into joint underwriting associations
to help cover the losses of medical malpractice insurance companies by
spreading them to the cost of automobile, fire, and other policies.
The many studies made of the problem in 1973 and 1974 sug-
gested various remedies for the claimed defects in the system of
compensating malpractice claimants. These ranged from substitution
of a no-fault system for the present tort litigation system to minor
changes in the present system.
Changes recommended to the legislature, which were based on
congressional, insurance industry, and medical association studies, in-
cluded proposals to:
1. Abolish or control contingent fees to dampen the enthusiasm
of plaintiff attorneys.
2. Shorten statutes of limitation to eliminate "long tail" cases
where claims were brought twenty or more years after the service was
rendered or the injury received.
[Vol. 51:120
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3. Limit the amount of recovery to figures representing economic
loss, ceilings on any recovery, or workmen's compensation measures
of recovery.
4. Prohibit dollar demands stated in pleadings for publicity value.
5. Abolish the collateral source rule.
6. Mandate review of claims by professional peer panels before
suit can be tried, with either party entitled to introduce the panel's
opinion in court.
7. Mandate binding arbitration either by statute or by contract
between patient and doctor.
8. Prohibit recovery based on a guarantee of successful result
unless in writing. 2
9. Limit the informed consent doctrine.
10. Eliminate res ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases.
The implication of these studies was that a program which met
all or most of these problems and which permitted an adequate rate
would solve the availability problem. A method could not be suggested
which would guarantee a reduction in premium rates without a sub-
stantial reduction in the rights of patient-claimants.
The Indiana legislature, in its final refinement of the Medical
Malpractice Act, 3 adopted some of these remedies:
a. It prohibited money amount demands in the complaint.
b. It provided for a mandatory medical review panel to screen
all cases before trial.
c. It shortened the limitation period for minor claimants to two
years unless the service was rendered before their sixth birthday; in
which case the two years began to run on the sixth birthday.
d. It limited the recovery for damages from malpractice to
$500,000, with $100,000 being the limit of liability for any one de-
fendant, and provided a state fund by surcharge on premiums from
which excess awards up to the $500,000 limit would be made, to the
extent funds are available. The limitations of liability set forth in
the Act are made available only to health care providers who pay the
surcharge.
e. It denied recovery for failure to achieve a certain result from
treatment unless the guarantee was in writing.
12See Note, Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50
IND. L.J. 361, 377 n.58 (1975).
'' IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-1-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1975).
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f. It created a new residual market from which health care
providers who are refused coverage by two professional insurers can
get the coverage required by the statute, but at a rate exceeding that
charged by the professional insurers-probably by 200 percent.
CONCLUSION
We return to the question: Will the new Indiana Medical Mal-
practice Act make the insuring of doctors' professional liability attractive
to insurers? More specifically, will private insurance coverage remain
available to doctors?
Half, or more, of the doctors in Indiana have been insured with
one company. The rest have been spread among eight or ten other
companies, with the largest embracing about 20-25 percent of the
market, and most companies insuring 5 percent or less of the state's
doctors. If the hazards of great exposure and long tail liability set out
above were the only characteristics which made the business unattractive,
we could expect that, with a freely competitive rate structure, companies
would continue to write doctors' professional liability insurance or
even increase their writings. However, this is not universally true,
and since the Act only applies to occurrences which result from treatment
rendered or omitted after July 1, 1975, IBNR-incurred but not re-
ported-losses are a continuing threat to proper rate determinations.
Another uncertainty is the legal effect of the shorter limitation for
suit by minors, and whether it can be interpreted to apply to occurrences
before July 1, 1975, or only to occurrences after that date.
Also, even with the $100,000 limit of liability for each health
care provider, a company which writes policies for only 200 doctors
in Indiana, with a possibility that six or more will be sued each year,
has only a chance to break even on the business. If any losses occur
beyond that figure the hazard is greater, and with so few insureds the
expense and overhead make the figures marginal.
The hazards of judicial interpretation of the Act are very real-
including the fear of some companies that the language of the statute
would impose a duty to provide a policy whose terms conform to the
wording of the Act, so that some writers of "claims-made" forms
would have to guarantee renewal for the period of the statute of
limitations after retirement.
The $100,000 limitation on liability is attractive, but there is no
limit on the aggregate liability of the company and any such limit
(as 100 each occurrence, 300 each year) might be held invalid. Similarly,
[Vol. 51::120
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the statutory provision as to conformance of the policy might require
later changes by amendment of the policy. Whether or not these fears
are well-founded, they affect the available market. "
Moreover, the state regulators have refused to approve a "claims-
made" form of policy, and one company (St. Paul), which felt that
was the only form of policy which it was willing to offer, has effectively
left the market, with the result that 20 percent of the doctors in
Indiana will have to find new coverage as their present policies expire.
Generally, it may be expected that doctors will continue to be
insured. The insurer who has 50 percent or more of the market has
faith in the Act and expects to enlarge its writings. Companies with
a very small part of this business will probably stay in the market for
a while as an accommodation to long time insureds, and to wait and
see what impact the Act will have. Some smaller writers will feel they
have already stayed in the market too long at the request of the state
and the Medical Association, and will gradually cease writing new
business.
The net result will be that although professional liability coverage
will be available for all doctors, the price will be high until practice
under the new Act can be analyzed. Moreover, insurance will tend to
be placed either with one company or with the state-operated residual
market-at a 200 percent premium.
It can also safely be predicted that the Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act does not completely resolve the crisis in the professional liability
insurance industry. The legislature will undoubtedly face the issue again
in future sessions.
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